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LEGAL PREPAREDNESS FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: 
IS VIRGINIA READY? 
Kristen DiGirolamo 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On Wednesday, April 29, 2009, a Mexican child, being treated at a 
hospital in Texas, became the first casualty of the swine flu in the United 
States.1  By that time, hundreds of cases had already been reported 
worldwide.2  Healthcare officials have been worried about and planning for 
an influenza pandemic since the first bird flu scare in the early 2000s.3  
Now those plans are being put to the test.  Countries as far away as China 
have put people under quarantine in an effort to stop the spread of the 
H1N1 influenza strain.4  In the United States, some schools have even 
cancelled their graduation ceremonies.5 
Virginia has been taking its own precautions.  On April 27, 2009, Dr. 
Karen Remley, Virginia’s Health Commissioner, declared the 
Commonwealth to be in a state of public-health emergency.6  Virginia 
Governor Timothy Kaine also requested an extra 280,000 courses of 
antiviral medications to add to Virginia’s stockpile, bringing the state’s total  
 
1. Toddler Dies as Swine Flu Cases Mount, CNN.com, Apr. 30, 2009,  
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/04/29/swine.flu.cases/index.html?iref=newssearch (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2010). 
2. Id. 
3. Ctr. for Disease Control, Past Avian Influenza Outbreaks,  
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/outbreaks/past.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2010). 
4. Farmer May Have Given Swine Flu to Pigs, Canada Says, CNN.com, May 2, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/05/02/swine.flu/index.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2010). 
5. Mallory Simon, Students Can’t Be Part of Main Graduation because of Mexico Trip, CNN.com, May 
2, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/05/01/swine.flu.schools/index.html (last visited Apr. 29, 
2010). 
6. Tammie Smith &Jim Nolan, State Prepares for Flu Outbreak, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 28, 
2009, at A1, available at  http://www.timesdispatch.com/rtd/news/local/article/VFLU28_20090427-
222106/264318/. 
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stockpile to over 1 million.7  While the state’s efforts show that it is being 
vigilant in preparing for a mass outbreak, there is only so much that can be 
done before the virus hits on a widespread scale. 
Though it is too early to tell if this H1N1 strain will become a pandemic, 
it will at least serve to keep decision-makers alert and thinking about how to 
improve plans for pandemic response.  One often forgotten aspect of 
planning is the consideration of legal issues, which permeate every aspect 
of a pandemic – from the planning to the clean-up stages.  A public health 
emergency, and especially one for a contagious disease like influenza, is 
quite different than a natural or manmade disaster, like a hurricane or a 
terrorist attack.  There is no ground zero.  Because the virus is spread 
through human contact, it will spread to every corner of the globe.  A 
pandemic has the potential to affect every sector of the nation, from schools 
to banking, from food distribution to, most obviously, the healthcare 
system.  The question is not whether hospitals will be overwhelmed; it is 
whether hospitals will be open since healthcare workers are just as 
susceptible to the virus as anyone. 
So how can Virginia officials make sure that the Commonwealth is 
legally prepared for a pandemic?  One overarching problem of pandemic 
planning throughout the country is that there has not been enough 
communication between the legal community and the health community.8  
Healthcare workers have a set of norms they use every day, and they can 
instinctively react to emergencies. In a pandemic, all of those norms get 
thrown out the window, and what they instinctively want to do may not be 
legal.9  The first step to preparing for a pandemic must be to bring both 
sides of the problem together.  Another difficulty has been that even when 
the legal and healthcare communities come together, they look at a few 
issues, independent from each other.10  For example, they will decide what 
they can do about social distancing, distributing antivirals, and dealing with 
surge in hospitals, but they might forget to ask who has the authority and 
when they have that authority to make these decisions.  And what if their 
plans rely on a neighboring state’s aid, but that state cannot afford to 
provide any additional resources?  We cannot look at the legal issues of 
pandemic influenza in a vacuum.  This paper attempts to identify the legal 
issues at stake during a pandemic and how those issues need to be discussed 
as a whole when preparing.  Part II of this paper will give a brief 
7. Id. 
8. Health & Human Servs., HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan,  
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/sup8.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2010). 
9. See id. 
10. See id. 
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description of pandemic influenza and look at the Spanish Flu pandemic of 
1918.11  Part III will examine the origins of legal authority during a 
pandemic at the federal, state, and local levels of government.  Part IV will 
look at some of the specific legal issues that may arise during a pandemic 
and discuss what decision-makers need to be thinking about in order to plan 
comprehensively.  Part V will conclude by determining whether or not 
Virginia is legally prepared for pandemic influenza. 
II. HISTORY OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
A.  What is Pandemic Influenza? 
The problem with pandemic influenza is the unknown.  Pandemic 
influenza  (“pan flu”) is different from the seasonal flu we experience on an 
annual basis.12  “Pandemic influenza is a global outbreak of disease that 
occurs when a new influenza A virus appears in humans, causes serious 
illness and then spreads easily from person to person worldwide.”13  
Because it is so rare, and because it is a mutated form of the seasonal virus, 
humans normally have not built up immunities to it, making its effects more 
severe, even for healthy adults.14  Normally, when a person in their twenties 
gets the flu, he might take two or three days off of work (or not, if he is a 
law student) and feel better by the end of the week, especially if he got a flu 
shot at the beginning of the season.  This is will not be the case for 
pandemic influenza.  There is no flu shot for pandemic influenza, at least in 
its beginning stages, because labs can only make vaccines for a known 
virus.15 
The high level of contagiousness and severe symptoms of pan flu can 
potentially lead to a catastrophic situation in which every part of our daily 
lives is affected.  No country will be safe, and every age group will be 
vulnerable.  In a time when global travel is the norm, the virus will spread 
11. There were also pandemics in 1957 and 1968, but it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss 
each outbreak in the United States.  Ctr. For Disease Control, Influenza Pandemics of the 20th Century, 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no01/05-1254.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2010). Instead, I will 
discuss the 1918 pandemic because it was the most severe in the country’s history, and note its 
implications for legally preparedness now. 
12. Virginia Department of Health, Pandemic Influenza, http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/PandemicFlu/ 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2009) [hereinafter VDH Pandemic Influenza]. 
13. Id. 
14. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, How Does Seasonal Flu Differ from Pandemic 
Flu, http://pandemicflu.gov/season_or_pandemic.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2010). 
15. Virginia Department of Health, Pandemic Influenza: Vaccines and Antivirals,  
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/PandemicFlu/Vaccines_Antivirals.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2010). 
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faster than ever across the world.16  A pandemic could affect global markets 
and create an economic crisis.17  Access to utilities like power and water 
could be disturbed if enough people become sick.18  If our military is 
exposed, which it no doubt would be in a widespread pandemic, our war-
fighting effort could be hampered.19  While there is a possibility that it 
could be mild, effecting thousands instead of millions, there is also the 
possibility that the death toll could be astronomical, like it was in 1918.20 
B.  The Spanish Flu of 1918 
Perhaps one of the reasons the United States is so fearful of an influenza 
pandemic is the history of the disease.  In 1918, it is estimated that an 
influenza pandemic (the “Spanish Flu”) killed 675,000 Americans in a 
period of only ten months.21  As World War I ended, thousands of soldiers 
came home from Europe, bringing the virus with them.22  This strain of the 
virus brought 105 degree temperatures, severe body and joint aches, and 
sometimes led to pneumonia.23  The Spanish Flu also demonstrated a 
common characteristic of pan flu—it occurred in waves.24  The Spanish Flu 
occurred in three different waves, one beginning in the spring of 1918, the 
second in the fall of 1918, and the third in the spring of 1919.25  The second 
wave was actually the deadliest, claiming 90% of the total casualties.26 
 
16. World Health Org., Pandemic Preparedness, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic/en 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2010) [hereinafter WHO Pandemic Preparedness]. 
17. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND 
RECOVERY, 20-25 (Sept. 19, 2006)  available at  
http://www.flu.gov/professional/pdf/cikrpandemicinfluenzaguide.pdf. 
18. See VDH Pandemic Influenza, supra note 12. 
19. See WHO Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 16. 
20. See VDH Pandemic Influenza, supra note 12. 
21. ALFRED W. CROSBY, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC: THE INFLUENZA OF 1918 206 
(Cambridge University Press 2003) (1976).  While we cannot be sure how many died worldwide due to 
inaccurate reporting, experts estimate that the Spanish flu killed an estimated 20 million people 
throughout the world.  U.S. Dep’tof Health and Human Servs, The Great Pandemic: Influenza Strikes, 
http://1918.pandemicflu.gov/the_pandemic/01.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Influenza 
Strikes].  In Virginia alone, over 15,500 people died.  U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., The 
Great Pandemic: Virginia, http://1918.pandemicflu.gov/your_state/virginia.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 
2010). 
22. Influenza Strikes, supra note 21. 
23. Id. 
24. THE THREAT OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 8 (Stacey L. Knobler et al. eds., National Academic Press 
2005). 
25. Influenza Strikes, supra note 21. 
26. GlobalSecurity.org, Homeland Security: Flu Pandemic Timeline/Event Dynamics, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/hsc-scen-3_flu-pandemic-timeline.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 
2010). 
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There are numerous take away messages from the Spanish Flu.  In 2006, 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services hosted a workshop to look at lessons learned 
from the 1918 pandemic.27  An important issue the panel identified was the 
necessity of truthful communication between public officials and private 
citizens.28  During the Spanish Flu, because of the political climate created 
by World War I, public officials, in an attempt to subdue the fears of the 
public, routinely lied about the seriousness of the virus.29  There was great 
disconnect in the information the public was getting from their elected 
officials and public health officials.30  This led to an atmosphere of distrust, 
and it is this distrust that decision-makers need to be aware of when 
planning, because, as one panelist said, “It is when people feel totally 
alienated and isolated that society breaks down.”31  When people feel 
helpless, there is more potential for rioting or other outbreaks, requiring the 
use of law enforcement during public health emergencies.  Truthful 
communication about the disease to the public may be the first step in legal 
preparedness, because it has the ability to repress social unrest.  While this 
atmosphere of distrust can stem from poor communication, it can also result 
from ill preparedness—what is the point of communicating with the public 
if the government has no plans to ensure its safety?  For this reason, fully 
planning for pandemic response is vital to making sure that the government 
does not have to respond to social unrest on top of a public health 
emergency.  This planning must incorporate legally preparing for issues that 
will arise during a pandemic. 
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY 
An essential aspect of legal preparedness is a firm understanding by all 
those involved in pandemic response of who has what power and when they 
have that power.  Many times, the answers will be different depending on 
the state, and even the locality. 
27. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention & the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Pandemic 
Influenza, Past, Present, Future: Communicating Today based on the Lessons from the 1918-1919 
Influenza Pandemic (Oct.17, 2006), available at http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/workshop.pdf. 
28. Id. at 8. 
29. See id. at 7 (“There was a lot of cognitive dissonance.  People heard from authorities and 
newspapers that everything was fine, but at the same time, bodies were piling up.”). 
30. See id. at 10 (“In Baltimore, there were fights between elected officials and public health 
officials….In Pittsburg, the Mayor actually told the public to ignore public health officials.”). 
31. Id. at 10. 
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A.  Federal Powers 
Federal authority for regulating matters that affect public health initially 
comes from the Commerce Clause and Congress’s power of the purse.32  
These Constitutional authorities, read broadly, have become the foundation 
for numerous laws enacted by Congress to regulate public health 
emergencies.  The majority of federal powers to act during a public health 
emergency are created in three laws: “the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act (“Stafford Act”), the Public Health Services 
Act, and the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (“PAHPA”).”33  
Under the Stafford Act, the President may declare a state of emergency at 
the request of a Governor when there is a disaster “of such severity and 
magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and 
the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary.”34  
Once the President has declared a state of emergency, federal resources, 
including “personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, 
technical and advisory services” can be deployed to the state in support of 
state and local recovery efforts.35  A potential problem with asking for a 
declaration of a state of emergency of which governors and their senior 
emergency management staff need to be cognizant is that these federal 
resources will likely be coordinated by federal authorities.36  This may 
come as a surprise to some state officials, and could present command and 
control problems in the response and recovery of a pandemic.  For example, 
if federal resources in the form of antivirals are being distributed by federal 
employees, those employees may not be aware of (or not be required to 
abide by) a state plan for distribution.  This could cause public confusion 
about who will get the antivirals and where they are supposed to go.  Part of 
the legal preparation for a possible declaration of a state of emergency must 
be a plan for the integration of federal resources into the state’s preexisting 
response plans. 
Under the Public Health Services Act, the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services may determine that there is a public health 
emergency, allowing him to “take such action as may be appropriate to 
respond to the public health emergency, including making grants, providing 
awards for expenses, and entering into contracts and conducting and 
32. Brian Kamoie, et. al., Assessing Laws and Legal Authorities for Public Health Emergency Legal 
Preparedness, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 23, 24 (2008) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.). 
33. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal Triage During Public 
Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249, 257 (2008). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2006). 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(1) (2006). 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(2) (2006). 
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supporting investigations into the cause, treatment, or prevention of [the] 
disease.”37  This declaration will last 90 days, or upon termination by the 
Secretary, whichever is sooner, but it may be renewed if needed.38  
Specifically, this Act allows the Secretary to track and distribute federally 
purchased vaccines during a pandemic.39  Finally, the Act has an incentive 
built into it, allowing the Secretary to make awards to states that have 
completed and implemented, among other things, a pandemic influenza 
plan as part of their All-Hazards Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
and Response Plan.40 
In 2006, Congress enacted the PAHPA, when the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina revealed the confusion cause by multi-layers of declarations, each 
carrying its own authorizations for federal assistance.41  It answers the 
“who” question by identifying the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
as the leader of “all Federal public health and medical response to public 
health emergencies and incidents.”42  While centralizing federal power in 
one official should ease communication issues between states and the 
federal government, decision-makers need to be aware of this power in 
order to account for it in pandemic planning. 
B.  State Powers 
The Governor of Virginia is the Director of Emergency Management and 
has power to declare a state of emergency whenever “the safety and welfare 
of the people of the Commonwealth require the exercise of emergency 
measures due to a threatened or actual disaster.”43  He also has the power to 
request that the President declare a disaster so the state may be able to 
obtain federal assistance.44 
 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2006). 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2006). 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-1(a), (b) (2006). 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-3a(b)(2)(A) (2006).  This is an example of how the federal government uses its 
purse to influence state governments.  Though it is not able to mandate that states adopt certain plans, it 
is able to provide incentives for them to do so.  See  Ernest B. Abbott, Law, Federalism, the 
Constitution, and Control of Pandemic Flu, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 185, 192-193 (2008). See also 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“Congress cannot compel the States to enact or 
enforce a federal regulatory program….The Federal government may neither issue directives requiring 
the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political 
subdivision, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”). 
41. See Hodge & Anderson, supra note 33, at 261-62. 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 300hh(a) (2006). 
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.17(7) (2002 & Supp. 2009). 
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.17(8) (2002 & Supp. 2009). 
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The position of State Health Commissioner of Virginia 
(“Commissioner”) is established in the Code of Virginia at § 32.1-17.  The 
State Health Commission is the head of the Virginia Department of Health 
(“VDH”)45 and is responsible for coordinating VDH’s response to public 
health emergencies.46  Virginia also has the Virginia Board of Health,47 
which has the responsibility to “promulgate regulations and order to meet 
any emergency or to prevent a potential emergency caused by a disease 
dangerous to public health.”48 
A declaration of a state of emergency in Virginia triggers special powers 
for the Commissioner.  For example, during a state of emergency, the 
Commissioner may authorize certain persons to dispense drugs when they 
would not normally be authorized to do so.49  The Commissioner may also 
make use of any private or public building to enforce an order of quarantine 
or isolation.50  Even when a state of emergency has not been declared, the 
Commissioner may “...require quarantine, isolation, immunization, 
decontamination, or treatment of any individual or group of individuals 
when he determines any such measure to be necessary to control the spread 
of any disease of public health importance.”51  This power is important, 
especially at the beginning of a pandemic when only a few localities are 
affected and the Governor has not yet declared a state of emergency.  The 
Commissioner may also require citizens to be immunized during a 
pandemic if a vaccine exists.52 
C.  Local Powers 
In Virginia, each locality (both cities and counties) must have its own 
local health department.53  Typically pan flu spreads so quickly that the 
Governor would react immediately and the state response system would go 
into effect.  However, before that happens, local health departments may 
promulgate and follow their own rules and regulations, as long as they are 
not “less stringent in the protection of public health than any applicable 
state law or applicable regulations of the Board [of Health].”54  Localities 
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-16 (2009). 
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-19(D) (2009). 
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-5 (2009). 
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-42 (2009). 
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-42.1 (2009). 
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.017 (2009). 
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-43 (2009). 
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48(A) (2009). 
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-30 (2009). 
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-34 (2009). 
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will want to have plans in place for dealing with a sudden outbreak in a 
hospital.  In addition, the state needs to make sure that when writing its pan 
flu plan, it accounts for the differences in localities, especially in Virginia, 
where Fairfax County will have much more robust healthcare facilities than 
Washington County. 
D.  First Responders 
In addition to knowing who is in charge, it is important to understand 
who will respond to a pandemic and how they fit into the command 
structure of that response.  The magnitude of pan a pan flu response will 
require the assistance of numerous agencies, organizations, and individuals.  
While very few of these individuals are actually “in charge,” many times 
they are operating within a complex and confusing response network.  One 
of the first steps to legal preparedness must be to help every responder 
understand his role in the system, and how to get what he needs to 
adequately fulfill this role.  As the Principal of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency Law Associates noted, “[g]iven the number and the 
diversity of organizations that respond to a disaster and the lack of a single 
‘commander’ of those resources, it is critical that these institutions ‘speak 
the same language.’”55 
The federal government and many states, including Virginia, have 
enacted laws and procedures to ensure that everyone “speaks the same 
language” during an emergency response.  After 9/11, President Bush 
issued Homeland Security Directives 5 and 8, requiring the Department of 
Homeland Security to create a National Incident Management System 
(“NIMS”) to ensure that responses are quick and seamless between 
agencies.56  NIMS was approved on March 1, 2004, and “establishe[ed] 
standard incident management processes, protocols and procedures so that 
all local, state, federal and private-sector emergency responders can 
coordinate their responses, share a common focus and place full emphasis 
on resolving the event.”57  Because NIMS provides a template for 
managing emergencies, each locality and state should have the same 
55. Abbott, supra note 40, at  193. 
56. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 (Feb. 
28, 2003),  available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html; Press Release, Office of the 
Press Sec’y, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8 (Dec. 17, 2003), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm.  Part of these directives codified NIMS in 
the Homeland Security Act.  See 6 U.S.C. §§ 319, 320 (2002 & Supp. 2009).  Note how this was a legal 
response to an operating issue.  See also Abbott, supra note 40, at 194. 
57. Virginia Dep’t of Emergency Mgmt., Programs & Services: NIMS,  
http://www.vaemergency.com/programs/nims/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 24 2010). 
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information during a large scale disaster.58  During a pandemic, if all 
localities and states are NIMS compliant, volunteers will be able to travel 
from one locality to another without having to learn a new system for 
providing help and requesting resources.  This coordination will be vital to 
a successful response, especially in the chaotic atmosphere of a pandemic.59  
The federal government once again uses funding to incentivize the states to 
adopt NIMS— compliance is required by both local governments and state 
agencies to receive federal preparedness assistance.60 
IV. LEGAL ISSUES 
On top of these complex systems of authority numerous legal issues for 
pandemic response arise.  This section will identify a number of these 
issues, also show why it is important that decision-makers not look at them 
independently, but comprehensively and within the existing law for public 
health emergencies. 
A.  Social Distancing 
Though many automatically think of quarantine as the first response to a 
widespread public health emergency involving a contagious disease, there 
are other less drastic steps that can be taken first.  There are serveral ways 
to create social distance between populations to try to stop the spread of pan 
flu, including closing schools or offices, isolating infected individuals and 
quarantining others. 
1.  Closing Schools and Offices 
The first step in social distancing is voluntary.  Parents can choose to 
keep a sick child home from school and take time off of work during the 
incubation period, which is five days after the onset of symptoms.61  After 
that, communities need to consider closing schools for a period of time in 
order to reduce the level of exposure to the larger community.62  As one 
58. See generally Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, About the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/AboutNIMS.shtm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010). 
59. See Demetrios L. Kouzoukas, Public Health Emergency Legal Preparedness: Legal Practitioner 
Perspectives, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 18, 20-21 (2008). 
60. See Virginia Dep’t of Emergency Mgmt., Programs & Services: NIMS, 
http://www.vaemergency.com/programs/nims/index.cfm (last visited May 8, 2009). 
61. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan: Supplement 4, Infection 
Control, S4-17, Nov. 2005, available at http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/S04.pdf. 
62. The Ctr. for Law & the Pub. Health , Legal Preparedness for School Closures in Response to 
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report noted, “modeling and analyses suggest that widespread school 
closures may reduce the incidence of infection (i.e. the attack rate) in a 
community over a period of time.”63  The same would be true of closing 
offices or allowing people to work from home. 
While closing schools may help to mitigate the spread of pan flu, 
depending on the length of the closure, it could also have an adverse effect 
on families and communities.  Besides children missing school, potentially 
for months, parents will also have to make plans to care for them.64  If 
parents have to leave their jobs to stay home with their children, the 
economic stability of the community could be at risk.65  For this reason, 
states should work with the private sector to establish guidelines for 
alternative work schedules during a pandemic, such as telecommuting.  
Fortunately, because of advances in technology, this will be much more 
feasible than during past pandemics. 
Virginia has identified school closures as an option for controlling the 
spread of pan flu in its Pandemic Influenza Plan.66  This plan identifies who 
has the authority to close schools: first it is “the ability of local school 
boards and superintendents to close school is inherent in the power given to 
them in Article VIII, Section 7 of the Constitution of Virginia,” and second, 
“the Board of Health has the authority to close schools in order to prevent a 
potential emergency caused by a disease dangerous to public health  (Code 
of Virginia at § 32.1-42).”67  The problem with these authorizations is that 
they are not clear as to when and who may close a school.  According to 
this plan, the Board of Health is authorized to close schools by § 32.1-42 of 
the Code of Virginia. This section reads: 
The Board of Health may promulgate regulations and 
orders to meet any emergency or to prevent a potential 
emergency caused by a disease dangerous to public health, 
including, but not limited to, procedures specifically 
responding to any disease listed pursuant to § 32.1-35 that 
is determined to be caused by an agent or substance used as 
a weapon or any communicable disease of public health  
Pandemic Influenza and Other Emergencies, 8,  Apr. 2008, available at  
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/professional/school/schoolclosures.pdf 
63. Id. at 10. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. See Virginia Department of Education, Pandemic Influenza Plan: Guidelines for Virginia Public 
Schools 5 (May 2008), available at http://www.doe.virginia.gov/VDOE/studentsrvcs/panflu.pdf. 
67. Id. 
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threat that is involved in an order of quarantine or an order 
of isolation pursuant to Article 3.02 (§ 32.1-48.05 et seq.) 
of this chapter.68 
This section never clearly states that the Board of Health may close 
schools and does not say whether or not there must be a declaration of a 
state of emergency by the Governor beforehand.  Similarly vague, article 
VIII, section 7 of the Virginia Constitution, which the plan claims gives 
authority to local school board to close schools states, “[t]he supervision of 
schools in each school division shall be vested in a school board, to be 
composed of members selected in the manner, for the term, possessing the 
qualifications, and to the number provided by law.”69  Neither of these 
sources expressly gives authority to either entity to close schools.  While 
that authority would probably be deemed by a court to be inherent, it leaves 
the officials confused as to when they can close a school.  This confusion 
could lead to slow reactions, whereas, if the authority was expressly created 
in law, response would be faster and more effective. 
2.  Isolation and Quarantine 
Isolation and quarantine are more drastic steps aimed at restricting 
people’s movements in order to limit the spread of pan flu by creating a 
“social distance” between the exposed and the general population.  Isolation 
occurs when a patient who has been diagnosed with a communicable 
disease is removed from the public.70  A quarantine occurs when people 
who have not been diagnosed with a communicable disease, but have been 
or may have been exposed to one, are isolated from the public.71  This 
difference is important because, where people who have been diagnosed 
will probably be willing to be isolated because they know they pose a health 
risk to the public, people who have not been diagnosed may see no reason 
for their quarantine and so may challenge it on constitutional due process 
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-42 (2009). 
69. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7. 
70. See Abbott, supra note 40, at 195.  See also VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.06 (2009) (“‘Isolation’ 
means the physical separation, including confinement or restriction of movement, of an individual or 
individuals who are infected with or are reasonably suspected to be infected with a communicable 
disease of public health threat in order to prevent or limit the transmission of the communicable disease 
of public health threat to other uninfected and unexposed individuals.”). 
71. See Abbott, supra note 40 at 196.  See also VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.06 (2008) (“Quarantine 
means the physical separation, including confinement or restriction of movement, of an individual or 
individuals who are present within an affected area, as defined herein, or who are known to have been 
exposed or may reasonably be suspected to have been exposed to a communicable disease of public 
health threat and who do not yet show signs or symptoms of infection with the communicable disease of 
public health threat in order to prevent or limit the transmission of the communicable disease of public 
health threat to other unexposed and uninfected individuals.”). 
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grounds.72  For this reason, it is vital that lawmakers carefully and clearly 
lay out the circumstances in which people can be mandatorily isolated or 
quarantined.  It is equally important that these steps are followed during a 
public health emergency. 
For example, in Best v. St. Vincents Hospital, Best was diagnosed with 
tuberculosis and detained by the hospital as a health risk to the community 
because he was contagious and refused to complete his treatment.73  He 
sued the hospital and the state, claiming that his Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights had been violated.74  Best first argued that 
his substantive due process rights had been violated because New York’s 
tuberculosis control statutes violated his fundamental right to liberty.75  The 
court noted that “substantive due process comes into play where, regardless 
of the procedures followed, a governmental decision or action is so contrary 
to a fundamental right that it cannot be countenanced.”76  Here, the court 
found that Best’s liberty was a fundamental right, which had been 
substantially infringed when he was held in the hospital against his will.77  
The only way the hospital could overcome violating Best’s due process 
rights would be to show that the state had a “substantial governmental 
interest” in detaining him against his will.78  The court noted that previously 
the Supreme Court of the United States had upheld the constitutionality of 
quarantine laws as public health measures.79  Finally, it found that there 
must be an assessment of each individual to determine whether he would 
comply with the hospital’s recommendations for social isolation during the 
contagious period of tuberculosis, and that according to Best’s past 
behavior, like refusing to continue his treatment, he would not be willing to 
72. See Abbott, supra note 40 at 196-99. 
73. Best v. St. Vincents Hosp., No. 03CV.0365, 2003 WL 21518829, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  The 
statute that authorized Best’s detention allowed quarantine for a person with tuberculosis when: 
…there is a substantial likelihood, based on the person's past or present behavior, 
that the individual cannot be relied upon to participate in or complete an 
appropriate prescribed course of medication or, if necessary, follow required 
contagion precautions for tuberculosis. Such behavior may include the refusal or 
failure to take medication or to complete treatment for tuberculosis, to keep 
appointments for the treatment of tuberculosis, or a disregard for contagion 
precautions. 
Id. at *9. 
74. Id. at *1. 
75. Id. at *5-6. 
76. Id. at *6. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id.  See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“Although this court has refrained from 
any attempt to define the limits of [the state's police] power, . . . it has distinctly recognized the authority 
of a State to enact quarantine laws and health laws of every description.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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comply with the hospital’s recommendations.80 Therefore, while Best’s 
substantive due process rights were violated, the hospital had a substantial 
governmental interest in continuing his detention to protect the 
community.81 
Best also claimed that his procedural due process rights were violated.82  
The statute allowing Best’s quarantine set out specific procedural guidelines 
to be followed, such as obtaining a court order for the detention after a 
certain number of days, and the court found that the hospital followed them 
when detaining Best.83  Additionally, the court found that the processes laid 
out in the statute were sufficient to protect his procedural due process under 
the Constitution.84 
Best is important because it highlights potential legal issues with 
quarantine laws for pan flu.  It is because of the constitutional 
challenges in Best that states must be legally prepared to handle 
possible quarantine.  If a state is not legally prepared for a quarantine, 
then, in the midst of an influenza pandemic, the courts could become 
backlogged with complaints and sick people could be allowed back into 
the community on a legal technicality. 
Fortunately in Virginia the Attorney General’s office and VDH have 
worked hard to ensure that the state is legally prepared for quarantine 
during pan flu.85  Under §32.1-43 of the Code of Virginia, the 
Commissioner has the authority to require quarantine or isolation of an 
individual or group when he determines that it is “necessary to control the 
spread of any disease of public health importance.”86  Under normal 
circumstances, before a person can be isolated or quarantined, there are 
detailed procedures that must be followed.87  During a pandemic, these 
procedures, which include an investigation to find that the individual has a 
communicable disease and is engaging in “at-risk” behavior, will likely be  
 
80. Best, 2003 WL 21518829 at *7. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at *9. 
83. Id. at *10. 
84. Id. at *13. 
85. See Va. Dep’t of Health & Va. Attorney Gens. Office, An Overview of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia’s Statutory Authorities Relevant to Social Distancing, July 31, 2007, 
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/EPR/pdf/Social%20Distancing%20Law%20Project%20Phase%20I%207_
31_07.pdf [hereinafter Overview of Virginia Social Distancing]. 
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-43 (2009). 
87. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-48.02, 32.1-48.03, 32.1-48.04 (2009). 
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too cumbersome and lengthy to make the isolation or quarantine effective.88  
In this situation, the Commissioner may find that there are “exceptional 
circumstances”89 and, 
initiate a more rapid response by: issuing order to 
immediately isolate an infected or potentially infected 
person; issuing orders to immediately quarantine exposed 
or potentially exposed persons; [or] issuing orders to isolate 
and/or quarantine individuals as a group through defining 
an ‘effected area’ (when a state of emergency has been 
declared by the Governor for the affected area).90 
Even during exceptional circumstance, there are specific procedures that 
must be followed to insure that an individual’s due process is not violated.91 
Virginia’s legal and health communities have created a comprehensive 
legal scheme for isolation and quarantine.  This preparation will enable 
health care officials (as long as they abide by the procedures set forth in the 
Code of Virginia) to efficiently and effectively distance exposed and 
infected individuals from the general population without major legal 
problems holding up the process.  This fast response is key to ensuring the 
spread of pan flu is curtailed as quickly as possible. 
B.  Mutual Aid and Liability Concerns 
During any public health emergency, resources of a community can be 
quickly overwhelmed, making it necessary to rely on outside assistance.  
This assistance can come from other states, volunteer organizations or the 
private sector.  However, the additional assistance comes with liability 
concerns.  According to one study, 
Almost sixty percent of clinicians indicated that having 
medical malpractice insurance coverage would be 
important (24.3%) or essential (35.4%) to their decision to 
travel out of state to provide assistance during an 
emergency.  Almost seventy percent of respondents  
 
 
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.02 (2009). 
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.05 (2009). 
90. Overview of Virginia Social Distancing, supra note 85, at 14. 
91. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-48.05, 32.1-48.07 (2009). 
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answered that immunity from civil lawsuits would be an 
important (35.6%) or essential (33.8%) factor when 
considering whether to volunteer in an emergency.92 
Especially amidst the chaos of a pan flu epidemic, health care 
professionals and volunteers will have to work quickly and perhaps at a 
lower standard of care than what they would normally provide.  This opens 
them up to negligence suits, from which they will want immunity if they are 
going to provide assistance. 
1.  Emergency Management Assistance Compact (“EMAC”) 
EMAC was developed as a mutual aid agreement among the states to 
address issues of liability and resource sharing up front so a state does not 
have to be concerned with these issues during an emergency.93  Virginia 
codified the EMAC in 1995.94  One of the main purposes of the EMAC is 
to promote “[t]he prompt, full, and effective utilization of resources of the 
participating states, including any resources on hand or available from the 
federal government or any other source, that are essential to the safety, care, 
and welfare of the people in the event of any emergency.”95  As long as the 
assisting state does not need the resources for its own emergency, it must 
provide assistance (including use of National Guard Forces) to the 
requesting state.96 
Two important provisions of the EMAC discuss licensing and liability.  
Under Article V, a person who is licensed in one state to provide services 
will be deemed to be licensed in the requesting state to provide those same 
services during a declared emergency.97  This is important because 
normally a nurse, for example, would only be able to practice in the state in 
which she is licensed.98  EMAC recognizes that during a pandemic, nurses 
do not have time to register in another state, and carves out an exception 
from the existing law for assistance during declarations of emer
 
92. Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health 
Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1917 (2008). 
93. See generally National Emergency Management Association, Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact, http://www.emacweb.org/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2010) (explaining that EMAC is an 
organization that provides “form and structure to interstate mutual aid.” EMAC allows impacted states 
to request and receive assistance quickly and efficiently.). 
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.28:1 (2009). 
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.28:1, art. II (2009). 
96. See VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.28:1, art. IV (2009). 
97. See VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.28:1, art. V (2009). 
98. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-3005, 54.1-3008 (2009). 
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Under Article VI, the EMAC limits liability for officers or employees of 
the assisting state.99  It provides, 
No party state or its officers or employees rendering aid in 
another state pursuant to this compact shall be liable on 
account of any act or omission in good faith on the part of 
such forces while so engaged or on account of the 
maintenance or use of any equipment or supplies in 
connection therewith.100 
While EMAC limits liability for acts or omissions “in good faith,” it does 
not limit liability for willful misconduct, gross negligence, or 
recklessness.101  This is an important distinction, because resources will be 
coming in from many different places—individuals must have a legal 
recourse for injuries they sustain due to a complete lack of care by officials 
or employees of the assisting state.  Some experts have noted that legal gaps 
remain in this section of EMAC.  The limited liability protection only 
applies to officers and employees of the assisting state, but not to other 
individuals, and it does not apply before the governor of the requesting state 
has declared a state of emergency.102  These important issues will have to 
be addressed in other sections of the law. 
2.  Volunteers and the Private Sector 
During a pandemic, Virginia’s state and local resources will quickly be 
exhausted.  Federal aid may or may not be available, depending on the 
severity and spread of the virus.  Volunteers, both individuals and 
organizations, will be critical to Virginia’s response.  As was previously 
noted, volunteers may be hesitant to come forward if there are no limitation 
of liability laws to protect them.  Virginia has recently expanded traditional 
immunity statutes (which only protected government employees) to cover 
volunteers during emergencies. 
Virginia is one of many state that have Good Samaritan statutes that limit 
liability for individuals who render aid at the scene of an accident and 
Virginia is no exception.103 The Code of Virginia protects individuals and 
doctors who render aid without receiving compensation during an 
99. See VA. CODE ANN. §44-146.28:1, art. VI (2009). 
100. VA. CODE ANN. §44-146.28:1, art. VI (2009). 
101. VA. CODE ANN. §44-146.28:1, art. VI (2009). 
102. Rick Hogan, et al., Assessing Cross-Sectoral and Cross-Jurisdictional Coordination for Public 
Health Emergency Legal Preparedness, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 36, 39 (2008). 
103. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225(A)(1) (2009). 
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emergency.104  This statute leaves a gap for pan flu, which is an ongoing 
condition and not an “emergency” as we would generally think of the word.  
There is another statute specifically granting immunity to healthcare 
providers who provide aid during disasters or emergencies, and an 
emergency in this statute will include pan flu.105  This statute may assist 
healthcare providers who will be the primary responders during pan flu, but 
they will still need the assistance of other groups to provide additional aid 
and resources. 
In 2004, Virginia codified immunity for two volunteer groups: the 
Medical Reserve Corps and Community Emergency Response Teams.106  
The Virginia Medical Reserve Corps are “teams of local volunteer medical, 
public health professionals, and community members who volunteer to 
contribute their skills, expertise, and time to support ongoing public health 
initiatives and public health emergencies in localities across Virginia.”107  
Community Emergency Response Teams (“CERTs”) are locally based 
groups of volunteers (training is open to any citizen) that come in during a 
disaster to provide assistance to first responders.108  These groups are 
provided civil immunity as long as they perform their duties in good faith 
and in accordance with Virginia law and regulations.109 
But what about the volunteers who are not part of these groups (like 
church groups or Red Cross volunteers)?  Just this year, the Virginia 
General Assembly passed limited liability legislation for individuals and 
groups who volunteer: 
1) pursuant to a Governor-declared emergency or during a 
formal exercise or training of the State Department of 
Emergency Management or a responsible county or city 
emergency management entity; and 2) at the request and 
direction of the State Department of Emergency 
Management or a county or city employee whose 
responsibilities include emergency management.110 
 
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225(B) (2009). 
105. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-225.01, 8.01-225.02 (2009). 
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 31.2-48.016 (2009). 
107. Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Medical Reserve Corps, http://www.vdh.state.va.us/mrc/ 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2010). 
108. See e.g. Charlottesville-UVA Albemarle County CERT, What is CERT?,  
http://www.charlottesvillecert.org/ (last visited May 8, 2009). 
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 31.2-48.016 (2009). 
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.23(F) (2009). 
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Though there has not been a case law to test this new statute, it seems 
that it would cover volunteers rendering aid during a pandemic from civil 
liability for injury or death.111 
3.  Standards of Care 
The primary cause of action brought by individuals who are harmed 
during a pandemic will be for negligence. Whether or not they are 
successful with a negligence claim will be depend on what the court 
determines the standard of care during a pandemic to be.  Some healthcare 
professionals have tried to alter the normal medical standards of care for 
public health emergencies because they know their resources—and their 
services—will be overwhelmed and they will not be able to perform as they 
normally would.112 
The Virginia Hospital and Healthcare Association put together a working 
group to address altered standards of care in Virginia.113  The legal standard 
of care requires that a practitioner “use the degree of skill and diligence in 
the care and treatment of his patient that a reasonably prudent doctor in the 
same field of practice or specialty in this State would have used under the 
circumstance of this case.”114  According to this definition, during a 
pandemic a court would take into consideration the circumstances under 
which the treatment was given, including the scarcity of resources.115  
Virginia should adopt clear guidelines for distribution of scarce resources 
during an emergency so that healthcare providers may be sure that they will 
be deemed to have followed the standard of care if they adhere to those 
guidelines.116 
C.  Allocation of Scarce Resources 
Resources will be quickly expended in the event of a public health 
emergency in which a large percentage of the population is infected.  It is 
important to remember that resources are not just things, like hospital beds 
and medication, but also people. 
111. See VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.23(F) (2009). 
112. See generally Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Altered Standards of Care in Mass 
Casualty Events: Bioterrorism and Other Public Health Emergencies,  
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/altstand/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2009). 
113. See Steven D. Gravely, Altered Standards of Care: An Overview 5, www.vdh.state.va.us/ 
EPR/pdf/Health_and_Medical_Subpanel.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2009). 
114. Id. at 6. 
115. Id. at 7. 
116. See id. at 10. 
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1.  Things: Distribution of Vaccines and Antivirals 
When allocating scarce resources, liability is only a minor concern for 
healthcare providers compared to the ethical considerations of using 
resources to save some lives while letting others die.  During a pandemic, 
“healthcare providers will be in the conspicuous and unfortunate position of 
turning away many deathly ill people.”117 
Virginia has a stockpile of about one million courses of antiviral 
medication for influenza,118  but Virginia also has a population of almost 
eighth million.119  That means that even if Virginia decides to use its entire 
stockpile during a pandemic, seven million people will not get the 
medication.  When people find out they will not be able to obtain the 
antiviral, there is a potential for civil unrest, delaying response efforts even 
further.  For this reason, 
[I]t is imperative that we begin drafting and publically 
justifying our selection criteria now, well before a 
pandemic is upon us.  The stakes are so high, and the issue 
so volatile, that the public must come to understand and 
accept, if only somewhat passively, the rationale for 
distribution well before an epidemic strikes that will 
inevitably stir up chaos in its wake.120 
The CDC recognizes that pandemic influenza is inherently different than 
normal seasonal flu vaccine allocation, in which the criteria for providing 
vaccines is based on who is at the highest risk for death.121  During a 
pandemic, the CDC suggests that the criteria should be based on 
“preserving the functioning of society” and that “[t]hose individuals who 
are essential to the provision of health care, public safety and the 
functioning of key aspects of society should receive priority in the 
distribution of vaccine, antivirals and other scarce resources.”122 
 
117. Meir Katz, Bioterrorism and Public Law: The Ethics of Scarce Medical Resource Allocation in 
Mass Casualty Situations, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 795-96 (2008). 
118. See discussion supra Introduction. 
119. U.S. Census Bureau, State and City Quick Facts,  
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/51000.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2009). 
120. John D. Arras, Rationing Vaccine During an Avian Influenza Pandemic: Why it Won’t Be Easy, 78 
YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 283, 284 (2005). 
121. Ethics Subcomm. of the Advisory Comm. to the Dir., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Preventions, 
Ethical Guidelines in Pandemic Influenza 2-3 (Feb. 15, 2007), available at  
http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/phethics/panFlu_Ethic_Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Ethical Guidelines]. 
122. Id. at 3. 
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Virginia, of course, does not have to accept this guidance when 
developing its own allocation plan.  The U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services has actually created a priority list in its Pandemic 
Influenza Plan which includes the population to be vaccinated or given 
antivirals and the rationale for putting them in certain tiers.123  For example, 
the top tier includes vaccine and antiviral manufacturers and healthcare 
workers who are in direct patient contact.124  The rationale for putting 
vaccine and antiviral manufacturers in the top tier is that we want “to assure 
maximum production of vaccine and antiviral drugs.”  The rationale for 
putting healthcare workers who are in direct patient contact in the top tier 
rests on the premise that “healthcare workers are required for quality 
medical care” and “there is little surge capacity among healthcare sector 
personnel to meet increased demand.”125 
Whatever course Virginia takes, it is essential that the justifications for 
prioritization are legally sound and that the process for distribution is fair.  
The CDC noted that there needs to be “consistency in applying standards 
across people and time.”126  If Virginia does not distribute vaccines and 
antivirals based on a fair classification of individuals or groups, it opens 
itself up to claims of equal protection violations.127 
2.  People: Compelling Healthcare Professionals to Work 
Vaccines and antivirals are not the only resources that will be scarce 
during a pan flu epidemic; convincing healthcare providers to work while 
their families are sick and there is a high risk of infection will not be easy.  
The American Medical Association “declared that ‘individual physicians 
have an obligation to provide urgent medical care during disasters’ and 
expressly stated that ‘[t]his ethical obligation holds even in the fact of 
greater than usual risks to their own safety, health or life.’”128  Yet other 
experts have stated, “physicians should not be expected to place themselves 
at greater risk than the benefit they can provide.”129  It is unknown what the 
123. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan: Appendix D: NVAC/ACIP 
Recommendations for Prioritization of Pandemic Influenza Vaccine and NVAC Recommendations on 
Pandemic Antiviral Drug Use (Nov. 2005), available at  
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/AppD.pdf. 
124. Id. at D-13. 
125. Id. 
126. Ethical Guidelines, supra note 121, at 5. 
127. See generally Katz, supra note 117, at 805-06. 
128. Carl H. Coleman, Beyond the Call of Duty: Compelling Health Care Professionals to Work during 
an Influenza Pandemic 94 IOWA L. REV. 1, 12 (2008) (quoting Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, 
Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Medical Ethics: Current Opinions with Annotations § 9.067 (2008)). 
129. Karine Morin et al., Physician Obligation in Disaster Preparedness and Response, 15 CAMBRIDGE 
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response of healthcare providers will be the event of a 1918-scale pan flu 
epidemic.  On one hand, during the HIV crisis in the 1980s, some 
physicians refused to treat patients who had the virus.130  On the other hand, 
most physicians continued to work during the SARS epidemic.131 
Some states require healthcare providers to work after a declaration of a 
public health emergency.132  While Virginia has no such statute, it does 
have one provision that directs the officers and personnel to cooperate with 
the Governor or the Virginia Department of Emergency Management in any 
requests for “services, equipment, supplies and facilities.”133  This language 
is much softer than the South Carolina statute, and will not compel 
individuals, even those employed by a state agency, to work during a 
declared emergency.  Whether healthcare professionals work will likely be 
left up to their individual judgment, which will be heavily influenced by 
their ability to obtain vaccines and antivirals, and their immunity from civil 
liability.  This is an example of how preparedness for the allocation of 
scarce resources is directly related to other aspects of pandemic planning. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Planning for pandemic influenza presents special challenges.  It is not a 
typical emergency type situation, like a hurricane or even a terrorist attack, 
where the emergency is centrally located in one area of the country.  Pan flu 
has the potential to reach every community in the United States and spread 
throughout the world.  Resources will be scarce and healthcare 
professionals will not be able to rely on normal standards of operation.  Pan 
flu requires early and extensive planning, and that planning must include 
the legal community.  Each issue that will come up during a pandemic 
affects the others, and a firm legal basis for the plans the government does 
adopt is essential to efficient response. 
To answer the question presented in the title, “Is Virginia Ready?,” is 
impossible.  We will not know if we are ready until a pandemic has come 
and gone.  Virginia has a strong start for pandemic planning, though there 
are still some areas that need to be clarified.134  While the Code of Virginia 
may be clear as to some issues like quarantine and isolation, decision-
Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 417, 420 (2006). 
130. Coleman, supra note 128, at 11. 
131. Id. at 13-14. 
132. See e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-570 (2002 & Supp. 200). 
133. Va. Code §44-146.24 (2008). 
134. See discussion supra Part IV (A)(1). 
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makers need to make sure the law is properly translated into the plans and 
that those plans are properly understood by those who will be in charge and 
responding to pan flu.  The creation of laws and procedures is only one 
step; the best response will be characterized by open communication 
between all levels of government, responders, and citizens as well as 
comprehensive planning, which must be anchored by a foundation of legal 
preparedness. 
